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Introduction
The evolution and maintenance of helping, which we
define as a behaviour that increases the direct fitness of
another individual (Lehmann & Keller, 2006), remains a
key puzzle that needs to be explained within the
framework of evolutionary theory. Why should an
individual conduct a behaviour that provides benefits
for others if selection favours individuals that maximize
their own fitness? Several reviews and target papers have
been published on this subject in recent years (Hammer-
stein, 2003a; Bshary & Bronstein, 2004; Sachs et al.,
2004; Lehmann & Keller, 2006; Noe¨, 2006; Nowak, 2006;
West et al., 2007; Bergmu¨ller et al., 2007a). The field of
cooperation has become a truly interdisciplinary medley
of research as evident from a recent edited book (Ham-
merstein, 2003a). Whereas this is exciting, problems arise
when scientists from different disciplines or even subdis-
ciplines try to communicate with each other for two
main reasons: (1) they use different terminology and (2)
they have different traditions regarding methodology
(Noe¨, 2006), reflecting the different kinds of question
that are addressed in the various fields.
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Abstract
The evolution and stability of helping behaviour has attracted great research
efforts across disciplines. However, the field is also characterized by a great
confusion over terminology and a number of disagreements, often between
disciplines but also along taxonomic boundaries. In an attempt to clarify
several issues, we identify four distinct research fields concerning the
evolution of helping: (1) basic social evolution theory that studies helping
within the framework of Hamilton’s inclusive fitness concept, i.e. direct and
indirect benefits, (2) an ecological approach that identifies settings that
promote life histories or interaction patterns that favour unconditional
cooperative and altruistic behaviour, e.g. conditions that lead to interdepen-
dency or interactions among kin, (3) the game theoretic approach that
identifies strategies that provide feedback and control mechanisms (protecting
from cheaters) favouring cooperative behaviour (e.g. pseudo-reciprocity,
reciprocity), and (4) the social scientists’ approach that particularly emphasizes
the special cognitive requirements necessary for human cooperative strategies.
The four fields differ with respect to the ‘mechanisms’ and the ‘conditions’
favouring helping they investigate. Other major differences concern a focus on
either the life-time fitness consequences or the immediate payoff conse-
quences of behaviour, and whether the behaviour of an individual or a whole
interaction is considered. We suggest that distinguishing between these four
separate fields and their complementary approaches will reduce misunder-
standings, facilitating further integration of concepts within and across
disciplines.
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West et al. (2007) show the pitfalls of inconsistent
definitions and bravely propose a coherent framework
for terminology. The more fundamental historical prob-
lem, however, is the diversity of methods and conceptual
approaches that are currently used. These differences are
often hidden because our everyday use of language
suggests that the same question is asked. Tinbergen
(1963) was the first to point out that a seemingly simple
question like ‘why does a starling sing?’ may be
answered in four fundamentally different ways. One
may try to understand the mechanisms or the ontogeny
of the behaviour (proximate questions) or one may try to
understand the adaptive value or the phylogeny of the
behaviour (ultimate questions) (Mayr, 1961; West et al.,
2007). Only if one specifies which of these four
approaches one is talking about it is possible to eliminate
the most basic source of confusion.
We address the evolution and stability of cooperation
in this article, so we ask an ultimate question about the
adaptive value of behaviour, which is the key question
for all ‘evolutionary scientists’ (evolutionary economists,
anthropologists, psychologists and biologists). However,
we will try to clarify that the current research on the
general question about the adaptive value of helping
can be subdivided in four more specific research topics,
each of which approaches the issue from a different
angle. Our distinction of four fields has partly been
foreshadowed by two recent conceptual papers (Leh-
mann & Keller, 2006; West et al., 2007) to which will
refer repeatedly in the article. Similar to the ‘4 whys’ in
biology, the four research topics on the evolution and
stability of helping must be kept separate to avoid
fruitless discussions. The basis for some confusion can
be attributed to terminology (West et al., 2007; Berg-
mu¨ller et al., 2007a). In particular, all researchers talk
about the ‘conditions’ and the ‘mechanisms’ that pro-
mote helping. These terms mean different things,
however, depending on the specific research field
(Table 1). The result is that researchers often believe
they are addressing the same questions, while the actual
theoretical models or the empirical data may in fact
tackle very different issues. We propose that in order to
avoid useless debates it is important to distinguish four
major aspects of helping that are currently investigated,
namely (1) basic social evolution theory, which explores
the evolutionary pathways that select for helping.
Helping only evolves under the condition that the actor’s
inclusive fitness is increased, while the mechanism is
either an increase in direct or in indirect fitness. (2) The
ecological approach still focuses on direct and indirect
benefits as mechanisms for the evolution of helping,
while the necessary conditions include life history
parameters and social systems. (3) The game theoretic
approach ‘translates’ ecological conditions into a game
structure (n interactions, payoff matrix), which provides
the conditions under which control mechanisms like
reciprocity, punishment, etc., may ensure that any form
of investment yields on average an increase in the
actor’s fitness. (4) The social scientists’ approach iden-
tifies psychological and physiological mechanisms that
promote helping in humans, while the conditions com-
prise moral values or the existence of specific brain
structures.
We will develop the differences between the four
fields in more detail later in this article, but we give a
quick first illustration with the example of a human
paying the bill for an unrelated individual in a restau-
rant. According to social evolution theory, this act of
helping must increase the inclusive fitness of the actor,
and in our example through direct fitness benefits. The
ecological approach would specify that humans are long
lived and social, and that there is therefore a high
probability of repeated interactions and interdepen-
dency between the two individuals, which facilitates
the evolution of helping through direct fitness benefits.
A game theoretician would derive a payoff matrix to
specify the costs and benefits of the act, calculate the
probability that the two meet again in the future, and
explore how the actor could possibly force reciprocation
if it is not given freely. Finally, cognitive scientists
would explore whether such giving is correlated with
moral values that make the actor feel good about
helping someone else, and whether this is achieved
through stimulation of the reward centre in the fore-
brain. We hope this example helps clarifying that the
four fields are indeed complementary and that they
address different questions. As a consequence, we need
a broad range of terms to capture the various questions
of interest and at the same time to avoid that the same
term has several meanings.
Table 1 The use of the terms ‘conditions’ and ‘mechanisms’ in four distinct approaches to the evolution and maintenance of helping
behaviour.
Evolutionary pathways Ecological settings Strategies Social scientists’ approach
Conditions Increase in inclusive fitness Overlapping generations, low
migration, group living, etc.
n interactions, payoff matrix,
body condition, etc.
Culture, moral, empathy,
specific brain structure
Mechanisms Direct or indirect fitness
benefits
Direct or indirect fitness benefits Punishment, reward, partner
switching, termination of
interaction, etc.
Psychological: guilt,
pleasure, etc.
Physiological: oxytocin,
brain stimulation, etc.
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Terminology
Whereas the goal of this paper is to highlight the
importance of distinguishing four major research topics
concerning the evolution of helping, we cannot escape
the issue of terminology. Our feeling, based on a recent
target article with 22 replies (special issue in Behavioural
Processes) is that the field is too much grown and too
diverse for any proposed terminology to become univer-
sally accepted. Therefore, it is very important that we
give clear definitions for every term we use so that each
reader can translate the content to her ⁄his use of
terminology. Our terminology attempts to fulfil three
criteria. (1) The terminology should allow us to cover the
research questions addressed in the four fields. (2) We
should avoid using the same term in different research
fields but with different meanings. (3) We should try to
accommodate recent attempts to clarify the terminology.
We propose that in order to address all relevant issues
on the evolution of helping, we need terms that cover
four different aspects (without corresponding one to one
to our four research fields). (1) A classification of social
behaviours by their influence on the lifetime direct fitness of
actor and recipient (keeping the recipient’s behaviour
constant). (2) A classification of social interactions by the
impact of two players on each other’s lifetime direct fitness.
(3) A classification of social behaviours in the context of
cooperation by their influence on the immediate payoff of
actor and recipient (keeping the recipient’s behaviour
constant). (4) A classification of social interactions in the
context of cooperation by the impact of two players on
each other’s immediate payoff.
In order to distinguish between behaviours of individ-
uals and the outcome of interactions, we use verb forms
for behaviours (following Hamilton, 1964, 1970) and
nouns for interactions, the latter being of key importance
in game theory (Dugatkin, 1997). We generate four 2 · 2
tables that capture the short-term or long-term outcomes
of either social behaviours or social interactions and our
corresponding terminology (Box 1). Below follows a
brief reasoning for our terminology.
1. A classification of social behaviours by their influence
on the lifetime direct fitness of actor and recipient (keeping
the recipient’s behaviour constant)
We need terms to formulate basic social evolution
theory. West et al. (2007) discuss the current confusion
in terminology in detail and propose a coherent frame-
work for terms that describe the average impact of a
social behaviour on the direct fitness of actor and
recipient. We adapted their terminology to our purposes
by transforming their terms, which were given as
nouns, into verbs. We refer to behaviour that increases
the direct fitness of both actor and recipient (+ ⁄+) as
mutually beneficial behaviour. Altruistic behaviour
reduces the direct fitness of the actor while increasing
the direct fitness of the recipient () ⁄+). A selfish
behaviour increases the direct fitness of the actor while
Box 1
How to explain the evolution of helping () ⁄+ or + ⁄+):
the necessary terminology.
1. A classification of social behaviours by their
influence on lifetime direct fitness of actor and
recipient (keeping the recipient’s behaviour constant).
Mutually beneficial behaviour and altruistic behav-
iour can be summarized as helping.
Recipient
+ )
Actor
+ Mutually beneficial behaviour Selfish behaviour
) Altruistic behaviour Spiteful behaviour
2. A classification of social interactions by the
impact of two players on each other’s lifetime direct
fitness
Player 2
+ )
Player 1
+ Cooperation (within species)
Mutualism (between species)
Altruism ⁄ parasitism ⁄ predation
) Altruism ⁄ parasitism ⁄ predation Competition
Spite
3. A classification of social behaviours in the
context of cooperation by their influence on the
immediate payoff of actor and recipient (keeping the
recipient’s behaviour constant)
Recipient
+ )
Actor
+ Self serving mutually beneficial behaviour Cheating
) Investing Punishing
4. A classification of social interactions in the
context of cooperation by the impact of two players on
each other’s immediate payoff
Player 2
+ )
Player 1
+ Mutual cooperation Exploitation
) Exploitation Mutual defection
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it decreases the direct fitness of the recipient (+ ⁄)) and
spiteful behaviour decreases the direct fitness of both
actor and recipient () ⁄)). Note that our use of the verb
form is in line with Hamilton (1964, 1970) who also
used verbs to describe social behaviours.
2. A classification of social interactions by the impact of
two players on each other’s lifetime direct fitness
While basic social evolution theory keeps the behav-
iour of recipients constant and hence focuses on the
behaviour of the actor, each individual is an agent and it
is therefore of interest to explore the impact of inter-
action partners on each other’s average lifetime direct
fitness. West et al. (2007) seem to agree in part with this
distinction as they note that studies on interspecific
mutualism describe the impact that each species has on
the other (i.e. the result of the interaction) and acknowl-
edge this question to be different from basic social
evolution theory (West et al., 2007, p. 4; right column).
The terminology we use is very much in line with
standard ecological literature (Begon et al., 2005), which
applies to both intraspecific and interspecific interactions.
We define a mutual positive influence (+ ⁄+ outcome) on
the direct fitness of interacting individuals as cooperation
if the partners belong to the same species and as
mutualism if the partners belong to different species
(Bronstein, 2001; Bshary & Bronstein, 2004). A ) ⁄+
outcome of interactions is altruism if the outcome is due
to ‘mutual agreement’. Otherwise, a ) ⁄+ outcome may
be due to parasitism or predation. Finally a mutually
negative effect on each other () ⁄)) could either be due to
mutual spite or due to competition.
3. A classification of social behaviours in the context of
cooperation by their influence on the immediate payoff of
actor and recipient (keeping the recipient’s behaviour
constant)
Whereas social evolution theory explores rather
simple conditions that allow to precisely describing
the conditions under which a behaviour is selected for,
real life situations are usually variable, and so is the
behaviour of individuals. Learning through positive
or negative reinforcement may modify behaviour in
virtually all animals (Wynne, 2001). Given that behav-
iour is often flexible and dependent on previous
experience, we need terms that describe how a
behaviour influences the immediate payoff of actor
and recipient. If the behaviour has immediate positive
effects for both actor and recipient, we term this a self
serving mutually beneficial behaviour (Cant & John-
stone, 2006). If the actor benefits while the recipients
looses, we call the behaviour cheating. If the actor has
immediate costs and the recipient immediate gains, we
call the behaviour investment. Finally, we call a
behaviour that reduces the immediate payoffs for both
actor and recipient ‘punishment’, following Clutton-
Brock & Parker (1995). These authors note that
punishment is ‘temporarily spiteful’ to emphasize the
) ⁄) description of the payoffs.
4. A classification of social interactions in the context of
cooperation by the impact of two players on each other’s
immediate payoff
Behaviour is often embedded in conditional strate-
gies, where current behaviour of self and of interacting
partners, in combination with the payoff received, may
influence future behaviour. An individual must be able
to respond appropriately to the behaviour of others. In
this context, the distinction between the action of a
single individual and the interaction between two
individuals is a fundamental aspect of game theoretic
analyses (Dugatkin, 1997; Bergmu¨ller et al., 2007a).
Certainly all of us will have had experience in
investing in another individual in hope of a return
on that investment which never materialized. In
such situations we behaved cooperatively but the
interaction was not cooperation. In conclusion, the
payoff of each player depends on both its own
behaviour and on how the other player behaves. We
therefore need terms that describe the outcomes of this
2 · 2 matrix. We term the mutual increase in payoffs
‘mutual cooperation’, whereas a positive payoff for one
player and a reduction in the payoff of the other is
termed ‘exploitation’. Finally, a mutually negative
consequence on each other’s payoff is termed ‘mutual
defection’.
As can been seen from the four 2 · 2 matrices in
Box 1, we managed to avoid using any term twice except
for the term ‘cooperation’, which we used for mutually
beneficial outcomes of interactions both in the short term
and with respect to average direct fitness consequences.
However, we think that the double use of cooperation is
not problematic as it seems logical that a mutual increase
in immediate payoffs will also translate into a mutual
increase in average direct fitness.
Surprisingly, we have not yet used the term ‘coop-
erative behaviour’ for our terminology in Box 1. In a
way, this is an advantage because this term has been
used in so many different ways in the literature. This
seems to be due in part to the fact that some scientists
study the short-term consequences of behaviour in the
form of payoff matrices, while others are interested in
the average fitness consequences. Keeping this distinc-
tion in mind, we define the term ‘cooperative behav-
iour’ in the short-term sense as a behaviour that is
either self-serving mutually beneficial or an investment
(table 3 in Box 1). With respect to lifetime fitness
consequences, cooperative behaviour must provide
direct fitness benefits, i.e. be a mutually beneficial
behaviour (table 1 in Box 1), to be under positive
selection.
The distinction between behaviour and the
underlying strategy
A final important issue for our terminology is that we
distinguish between behaviour and underlying strategy.
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We use the term ‘strategy’ loosely, following Maynard
Smith (1982) who described a strategy in a most
general way: the individual phenotype. Therefore, a
strategy is the specification of what an individual will
do in any situation in which it may find itself
(Maynard Smith, 1982). We do not distinguish
between genetically determined strategies and learned
strategies (tactics) because of two reasons. First, evolu-
tionary stable strategies (ESS), developmental stable
strategies (DSS) and cultural stable strategies (CSS)
seem to be conceptually quite similar in their basic
forms (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Dawkins, 1980;
Maynard Smith, 1982). Second, we usually lack infor-
mation on how genes and learning interact to produce
behaviour in a specific situation. Many evolutionary
game theoretic models on cooperation explore ‘strate-
gies’ but assume ⁄ allow that behaviour is learned
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak & Sigmund,
1990, 1998).
As long as strategies are unconditional (‘always
cooperate’ and ‘always defect’), they are equivalent
to the behaviour they produce. However, as soon
as individuals are able to flexibly react to changing
conditions or when they use information to make
decisions about their behaviour, the strategy becomes
conditional. For conditional strategies, we have to
specify the ‘decision rules’: what makes an individual
decide to show behaviour A instead of behaviour B? For
tit-for-tat, the decision rule specifies that a player
cooperates if the partner cooperated in the last inter-
action, and that she ⁄he cheats if the partner cheated in
the last interaction (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Coop-
erative strategies do not necessarily produce cooperative
behaviour. For example, a tit-for-tat player matched
against a cheater will cooperate in the first round but
never thereafter. Also, altruistic behaviour may be
conditional if it depends on a recognition mechanism
for kin or on greenbeard alleles. We define different
strategies in Table 2.
Four fundamental approaches to the
evolution of cooperation
Evolutionary pathways
In this section, we describe the answers to the most
fundamental functional question about helping behav-
iour, namely the possible selective forces (to which we
apply the term ‘evolutionary pathways’) that affect the
inclusive fitness of the actor in such a way that the
helping behaviour is under positive selection.
The evolutionary pathways that allow cooperation and
altruism to be selected for are most thoroughly presented
in Lehmann & Keller (2006) and West et al. (2007).
Lehmann & Keller (2006) use mathematical arguments to
define key pathways of cooperation and altruism. They
are interested in the average life time fitness consequences of a
behaviour. Helping, like any other behaviour, can only be
under positive selection if it increases on average the
inclusive fitness of the actor. As the inclusive fitness of an
individual consists of the sum of direct and indirect fitness,
all models on the evolutionary pathways promoting
helping behaviour can be subsumed into twomain classes
of models. In the first class of models, helping is selected
for because it increases the direct fitness of the actor (the
gene(s) coding for the behaviour), while in the second
class of models, helping is selected for because it increases
the indirect fitness of the actor (the gene(s) coding for the
behaviour). We refer to direct benefit models as models of
cooperative behaviour and to indirect benefit models as
models of altruistic behaviour. Models of cooperative
behaviour can be subdivided into two classes. An actor
may benefit a recipient either (1) because the actor gains a
direct fitness benefit from its action, which does not
depend on the recipient’s response, or (2) because the
investment was made in expectation of a future return
benefit that provides direct fitness benefits greater than
the costs of the initial investment. Likewise, models of
altruistic behaviour can be subdivided into two categories.
Table 2 Definitions of various strategies.
Strategy A strategy is a specification of what an individual will do in any situation in which it may find itself
(Maynard Smith, 1982). Strategy will mean the same as behaviour if the strategy produces a fixed
behaviour like ‘always invest’ or ‘always cheat’
Decision rule For conditional strategies, where the behaviour depends on the current state of the individual or its own or
the partner’s past behaviour, the presence ⁄ absence of observers, the decision rule specifies the
conditions that will cause an individual to choose a specific behaviour from its available options
in a given round
Cooperative strategy A strategy which, if played against itself, will increase the average payoff (and hence the direct fitness)
of the actor and of its partner
Unconditional cooperative strategy A strategy that will increase the average payoff (and hence the direct fitness) of the partner
independently of how this partner behaves
Conditional cooperative strategy A strategy that causes its bearer to start cooperatively but to respond to a cheating partner in a way
that the partner’s final payoff will be lower than if it had cooperated
Cheating strategy A strategy that causes its bearer to maximize its payoff in each current round at the same time
diminishing the partner’s payoff
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Altruistic behaviour prevails if (3) the actor makes an
investment that reduces its direct fitness but this cost is
more than compensated for by the recipient’s gain in
indirect fitness benefits through kin selection, or (4) if the
actor makes an investment because of a linkage between
altruistic behaviour and a phenotypic trait that allows the
individual to direct an investment towards others that
share the same allele(s) (the green beard scenario;
Hamilton, 1964; Dawkins, 1976). Helping behaviour
due to green beards is inherently instable because any
mutant with the trait but without the helping allele will
reap the benefits without incurring the costs and there-
fore have a selective advantage (Roberts & Sherratt, 2002;
Lehmann & Keller, 2006).
The key conclusion to be taken from Lehmann & Keller
(2006) andWest et al. (2007) is that as long as we focus on
evolutionary pathways, concepts are reasonably simple:
the condition that allows helping to evolve is an increase
in the inclusive fitness of the individual or the gene
coding for the behaviour, and for this condition to
be fulfilled, either the direct or the indirect fitness of the
actor (or for the gene coding for the behaviour) must be
increased relative to the average fitness in the population.
It is important to note that neither modern group
selection (for an excellent discussion on the history of
multi-level selection see Okasha, 2006) nor network
reciprocity (Lieberman et al., 2005; Nowak, 2006) offer
alternative pathways to explain helping behaviour. West
et al. (2007) show that in group selection models based on
‘weak altruism’ (Wilson, 1980, 1990), individual inves-
tors have a higher direct fitness than noninvestors on the
population level. Therefore, under such conditions every
individual should invest due to self-serving reasons; there
is no stable equilibrium that would favour the co-
existence of noninvestors. Alternatively, there is only
one viable solution to a behaviour that reduces the direct
fitness of its actor relative to the population average: there
must be compensation due to an increase in the indirect
fitness (Lehmann & Keller, 2006). Indirect fitness can
only increase due to a sorting mechanism that allows
preferential investment towards relatives or individuals
that share the gene in question: kin recognition mecha-
nisms, philopatry ⁄ limited dispersal or green beard mech-
anisms. As Lehmann & Keller (2006) point out, trait
group selection models and network reciprocity among
other papers (table 3 in Lehmann & Keller, 2006)
claiming to have found a new pathway to stable cooper-
ation or altruism have actually found a new ecological
context (demographic or environmental stochasticity)
that permits cooperation or altruism based on individual
selection or green beard selection (see next section).
Ecological contexts that facilitate cooperation and
altruism
Scientists interested in this aspect of the evolution of
helping behaviour explore the ecological conditions that
may cause helping to increase the inclusive fitness of the
actor. How comes for example that the actor is more
related to recipients of its altruistic behaviour than to
the average individual in the population? How is it
possible that individuals live under conditions that allow
for repeated interactions? The helping behaviour itself is
usually assumed to be totally unconditional or condi-
tional on external features of the recipient rather than
conditional on the behaviour of the recipient.
The major contribution of ecology to cooperation
theory concerns the evaluation of conditions that select
for the evolution of unconditional helping behaviour.
We use the term ‘ecology’ broadly defined as the
environmental conditions in which the individual lives,
including conspecifics (i.e. the social environment).
Important environmental factors include fluctuations in
food or shelter, abundance of predators or the partner or
competitor species. Such environmental factors shape to
a large extent the social environment such as, e.g.
demography, sex ratio, dispersal or group size. The latter
can in combination with resource distribution shape
competition (scramble vs. contest, within group vs.
between groups, within species vs. between species).
All the parameters will be reflected in the life history of a
species.
In models of altruistic behaviour, indiscriminate help-
ing may be selected for if there is a mechanism that
causes a nonrandom distribution of individuals such as
limited dispersal, which causes neighbouring individuals
to be more related to each other than to the average
individual of the population (Hamilton, 1964). Arguably,
the most debated ecological context that may favour
helping because of direct and ⁄or indirect benefits is group
living. Group living animals often experience conflicts
between members of the same group but in addition
members of the same group may be partners in conflicts
with individuals of other groups. The outcome of
between group conflicts may have serious consequences
for the fitness of the members both of the winning and of
the losing group. Access to food sources or refuges from
predators or from a harsh environment may be key
determinants of an individual’s fitness that are gained or
lost by all group members, depending on how well they
can defend ⁄ expand their territory. In primatology, it has
long been recognized that severe between group compe-
tition may foster increased tolerance or cooperation to
resolve within group competition (Wrangham, 1980; van
Schaik, 1983; Sterck et al., 1997): a dominant may
increase its inclusive fitness by sharing food or repro-
duction with subordinates if this makes the group
more competitive compared to other groups. Benefits of
grouping may select for unconditional cooperative
behaviour, i.e. in the absence of kin-based benefits of
helping. This form of cooperation has been termed ‘weak
altruism’ (Wilson, 1980, 1990) to emphasize that
within a group cooperators have a lower fitness than
noncooperators. Wilson (2008) maintains the position
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that defining altruism as a behaviour that increases group
fitness but which reduces the actor’s fitness relative to
other group members, while defining the selective forces
maintaining the behaviour as ‘group selection’ has let to
new insights due to a new perspective. We agree that
between-group competition is likely to be a major
selective force on the behaviour of social animals,
particularly humans (see Boyd et al., 2003; Gintis et al.,
2003). Nevertheless, as selection still works on the
inclusive fitness of individuals (relative to the average
inclusive fitness of individuals in the population) rather
than on the total fitness of the group, the term ‘group
selection’ is misleading. Helping simply cannot evolve if it
decreases the actor’s inclusive fitness (compared to the
average population level) even if it increases the fitness
of the actor’s group. The term ‘group competition’
captures the conditions that promote unconditional
contributions to public goods (that will benefit nonrela-
tives) in a much clearer way. As long as helpers have a
higher direct fitness than nonhelpers, an individual’s
contribution to a public good is not ‘altruistic’ but self-
serving and hence either what Brown (1983) termed
by-product mutualism or a form of pseudo-reciprocity
(Connor, 1986): both concepts have in common that an
individual gains by investing in group benefits due to the
synergistic effects of group living independently of how
other group members behave (West et al., 2007).
A variety of concepts, each using a different set of
terminology, explore how between-group competition
leads to cooperative behaviour while avoiding the
terms ‘altruism’ and ‘group selection’: West et al.
(2006a) distinguish ‘local competition’ (within group)
from ‘global competition’ (between groups) and investi-
gate how the relative importance of the two influence
cooperative behaviour in humans. Roberts (2005) coined
the term ‘interdependence between stake-holders’ to
describe conditions that select for cooperative behaviour.
He proposed that the ‘r’ in Hamilton’s famous formula
(Hamilton, 1964) can be interpreted as the degree of
relatedness between investor and recipient (the conven-
tional interpretation) but also more generally as every
interdependence that arises when individuals have an
interest or ‘stake’ in the fitness of the beneficiary,
because their own fitness depends on the well-being of
the receiver. In cooperative breeding, a mechanism
promoting unconditional cooperative behaviour based
on interdependence is group augmentation (Kokko et al.,
2001).
We will not go into detail discussing the various
ecology-based models that allow unconditional helping
to be selected for because of unconditional direct bene-
fits, kin selection or green beard selection but instead
refer to Lehmann & Keller (2006). While the ecological
conditions that promote cooperative or altruistic behav-
iour are diverse, the mechanisms by which the inclusive
fitness of an individual is increased remain the same as in
the field interested in evolutionary pathways: direct
and ⁄or indirect fitness benefits (Lehmann & Keller,
2006). Also the evolution of ‘strong reciprocity’ (Fehr &
Ga¨chter, 2002) is based on indirect benefits as strong
reciprocity depends on low dispersal as ecological condi-
tion, causing individuals who punish noncontributing
individuals to preferentially inflict costs on nonkin. This
form of spite yields indirect benefits because kin get a
selective advantage due to ‘strong ferocity’ (Gardner &
West, 2004; Gardner et al., 2007; Lehmann et al., 2007).
Spatial reciprocity and trait group selection are other
concepts where the stability of unconditional investment
is implicitly based on either unconditional direct benefits
or limited dispersal leading to kin interactions (Lehmann
& Keller, 2006). This may lead to kin selected helping as
long as the effects of kin competition do not outweigh the
benefits of helping kin (West et al., 2002).
Strategies
Game theory provides the tools for scientists interested in
the strategies ⁄decision rules that underlie helping behav-
iour and that may explain its evolution and stability.
Variation of cost or benefits from helping and number of
interactions between partners are factors that determine
the control mechanisms a player may use to prevent a
partner from cheating. The key contributions of game
theory include (1) an emphasis on the fact that an
individual’s best behavioural option may depend on how
the partner(s) behave, (2) a framework that may explain
variable behaviour both within individuals and between
individuals, and (3) the possibility to explore the evolu-
tionary dynamics of cooperative strategies, i.e. the spec-
ification of conditions that allow cooperative strategies
both to evolve and be maintained. We think this aspect
has been neglected in the recent conceptual papers by
Lehmann & Keller (2006) and by West et al. (2007).
Therefore, this approach will be described in much more
detail than the other approaches.
Scientists interested in the evolutionary pathways that
allow helping to be selected for investigate the average
consequences of a behaviour on lifetime direct and
indirect fitness, keeping the behaviour of the recipient
constant (Lehmann & Keller, 2006; West et al., 2007).
However, behaviour is flexible. Therefore, the behaviour
of one individual should be dependent on the behaviour
of other individuals rather than being fixed. Evolutionary
game theory (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Maynard
Smith, 1982) is the tool to explore the strategies that
must necessarily underlie such flexible behaviour and
which cause the adjustment of behaviour in response to
variable outcome of interactions. Trivers (1971) provided
the starting point for all research that seeks to understand
how cooperative behaviour can be enforced with his
concept of reciprocal investment (‘reciprocal altruism’).
The basic observation is that we can often observe
behaviours with the immediate effects of a benefit for the
recipient and a cost to the actor. For example, playing ‘C’
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in any round of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma is an
investment: by definition the payoff within the interac-
tion is lower than if the player had defected (Luce &
Raiffa, 1957). Only the partner’s future behaviour may
more than compensate for this investment. Therefore,
the question emerges how the investor ensures that it
will gain future benefits from the investment that will
more than compensate the current costs as otherwise this
form of helping would be counter-selected.
Here, we focus on individual strategies that promote
cooperation as there is hardly any research on altruistic
strategies. Cooperation often occurs between related
individuals (Clutton-Brock, 2002; West et al., 2002) but
the relevant models usually assume that partners are
unrelated to each other or that indirect benefits are not
high enough to promote helping behaviour. We will not
distinguish between intraspecific cooperation and inter-
specific mutualism, neither with respect to the models
nor with respect to examples that we will provide as
illustrations, as the general problem remains the same:
we want to know how investments may provide more
than compensatory benefits to the actor. More specifi-
cally, we want to know how the strategies of investors
ensure return benefits with cooperative partners or
reduce both own losses and the gains of a cheating
partner (Bshary & Bronstein, 2004; Sachs et al., 2004;
Noe¨, 2006). We therefore have to ask (1) how the
investment affects the behaviour of the recipient or of
bystanders and (2) how investors behave in a similar
situation in the future, depending on what their original
investment has yielded.
Two main approaches have been used in evolutionary
game theory. One approach is to first specify the game
structure, then to think about possible strategies and
finally to let the strategies compete against each other in
computer simulations to determine whether one or
more cooperative strategies could be evolutionarily
stable (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). The second
approach is to identify control mechanisms that may
favour cooperative partners while inflicting costs on
cheating partners, and to explore the range of condi-
tions in which the control mechanism may yield stable
cooperation. We will now present these two approaches
in more detail.
Searching evolutionarily stable cooperative strategies
The classic study for this kind of approach by Axelrod &
Hamilton (1981) provided the possibility to analyse the
evolutionary stability of competing strategies in the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. They first specified
the game structure: players are paired randomly, each
player has two behavioural options, a payoff matrix
specifies the payoff for each player in each possible
combination of behaviours, and there is a fixed proba-
bility of playing another round with the same partner.
In the second step, they asked colleagues to submit
strategies that they thought to be competitive in the
specified game structure. Finally, they ran a computer
tournament where the average payoff of a strategy in one
round of interactions translated into the strategy’s
abundance (increasing or decreasing in relative fre-
quency) in the next round. Axelrod & Hamilton (1981)
found two ‘winners’, either ‘always defect’ or ‘tit-for-tat’,
a simple conditional cooperative strategy that causes the
individual to start cooperatively in the first round and
then to copy the partner’s behaviour of each previous
round. Thus, a tit-for-tat player cooperates as long as the
partner cooperates but switches to cheating if the partner
cheats. Meanwhile, new conditional cooperative strate-
gies have been tested in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
and emerged as superior to tit-for-tat (references in
Dugatkin, 1997).
Maynard Smith (1982) noted that a weakness of the
research using game theory at that time was that too
much emphasis was made on finding stable equilibria
rather than trying to define the phenotype set, i.e. the
strategies that could be used by players. The variation
in potential strategies may be limited by constraints on
physiology, lack of information or lack of cognitive
abilities, among others. To give some examples, a
noncompetitive individual cannot reasonably threaten
to inflict harm on a noncooperative dominant; selec-
tively helping cooperative individuals requires close
spatial association so that individuals could in principle
acquire the necessary information, and also requires
strong memory capacities. It is therefore a key chal-
lenge for both theoreticians and empiricists to identify
all potential strategies that could be played in specific
case studies, applying their knowledge about the
system to identify constraints and elucidate the game
structure itself. Unfortunately, this effort has rarely
been made. Only for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game, a large variety of strategies has been developed
and tested against each other (Axelrod & Hamilton,
1981; Boyd, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992, 1993).
However, constraints on playing any one of these
strategies have rarely been addressed (but see Milinski
& Wedekind, 1998) and the game structure seems to
apply to very few known examples of cooperation
(Dugatkin, 1997), while they apparently are irrelevant
for the many known cases of mutualisms (Bergstrom
et al., 2003). For other games, few strategies have been
tested and potential constraints have been ignored. For
example, we are not aware of any study where various
strategies based on punishment as control mechanism
must compete against each other to see which one
prevails. Just to name a few possibilities, a punishment
strategy could be ‘always cooperate and punish your
partner after each round in which it failed to cooperate
as well’, or ‘play tit-for-tat and in addition punish the
partner for each defection’ or ‘start cooperatively,
punish your partner the first time it fails to cooperate
and switch to defection if the punishment does not
alter the partner’s behaviour’. To identify feasible
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strategies and their respective potential constraints
remains a key challenge for games other than the
prisoner’s dilemma.
The controlling components of cooperative strategies
A crucial component of a strategy is how individuals
foster cooperative behaviour on the part of the inter-
action partners or how they prevent cheating of the
partner. Individuals may for example match the partner’s
current behaviour in the next interaction (like tit-for-tat
does) or they could respond to cheating with aggression
or with the termination of the relationship. Such reac-
tions are called control mechanisms because they will
have negative effects on the total payoff of cheaters.
Analytical models can be used to specify conditions
under which a particular control mechanism may yield
stable cooperation. Over the last 20 years or so, a large
variety of concepts that may explain stable cooperation
have been developed. In the literature, one can find by-
product mutualism, pseudo-reciprocity, group augmen-
tation, pay-to-stay, reciprocity, threat of reciprocity,
parcelling, punishment, sanctions, power, partner
switching, generalized reciprocity, strong reciprocity,
policing, indirect reciprocity and social prestige. This
diversity results partly because some terms are synony-
mous. However, it has also become clear from empirical
advances that we need a large variety of concepts to grasp
all the known examples of cooperation and mutualism
(Bergmu¨ller et al., 2007a). In an attempt to point out
similarities and differences between each concept,
Bergmu¨ller et al. (2007a) found that most of the concepts
can be classified with a combination of four basic
parameters where each can be in one of two different
states. For a detailed discussion of this classification we
refer to the original paper as well as to 22 commentaries
and the authors’ reply (Bergmu¨ller et al., 2007b) in a
special edition of Behavioural Processes (2007). Below,
we restrict ourselves to a brief overview.
The following four parameters can be seen as building
blocks to define the controlling aspect of a strategy that
ensures that (within a certain parameter space) helping
yields on average a net fitness benefit for the helper. (1)
The act of helping: an investment or a self serving
mutually beneficial behaviour? (2) The return benefits:
an investment (i.e. a costly response) or a self serving
mutually beneficial behaviour? Reciprocity is defined by
mutual investment, whereas in pseudo-reciprocity the
behaviour of one player is self-serving mutually bene-
ficial. (3) Identity of the individual that provides the
return benefits: the recipient or a bystander in a
communication network (McGregor, 1993)? We call
the former a ‘direct response’ and the latter an ‘indirect
response’ (following Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). From the
perspective of the responding individual, it might be
more useful to describe direct benefits as experience
based and indirect benefits as information based (Roberts
& Sherratt, 2007). Note that this use of ‘direct response’
and ‘indirect response’ should not be confused with the
‘direct benefits’ and ‘indirect benefits’ through which the
inclusive fitness of the actor is increased. (4) The nature
of the return benefits: due to receiving a reward or due to
avoiding a cost? Following Clutton-Brock (2002) we use
the adjective ‘positive’ for the former and ‘negative’ if
failure to help causes the infliction of a cost (‘punish-
ment’). A combination of the states of the four param-
eters yields nine different basic concepts (Fig. 1, adapted
from Bergmu¨ller et al., 2007a).
The nine basic concepts that may explain why helping
leads to direct fitness benefits for the actor
1. By-product beneficial behaviour. In this simplest form of
cooperation, the mere existence of other individuals and
their self-serving actions provide benefits to others,
without involving investments. Its evolution and stability
is therefore straightforward (Dugatkin, 1997; Leimar &
Connor, 2003). Examples include cooperative hunting in
jackals (Lamprecht, 1978) and more generally apply to
cases of coordination (Clutton-Brock, 2002). Coordina-
tion is the basis for group living (selfish herd, Hamilton,
1971), mixed species associations and interspecific
coordinated hunting (Bshary et al., 2006). Also some
cases of group augmentation (Kokko et al., 2001) such as
self-serving contributions to public goods (West et al.,
2007, in their re-evaluation of ‘weak altruism’) fulfil the
criteria of cooperation.
2. Direct positive pseudo-reciprocity (=‘pseudo-reciprocity’,
‘group augmentation’). In pseudo-reciprocity the recipi-
ent will use an investment for its own benefits. The
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Fig. 1 Hierarchical classification of mechanisms that can maintain
cooperative behaviour. By-product mutualism does not involve (1)
investments that are directed towards others. An investment may be
performed to obtain benefits resulting from the self-serving behav-
iour of the receiver (i.e. pseudo-reciprocity), without eliciting return
investment. Alternatively, an investment may be (2) made in
expectation of an investment in return (costly response), resulting in
reciprocity. The investor may obtain benefits (3) either directly or
indirectly (i.e. via third parties). (4) Cooperative behaviour may be
stabilized by costly acts or by-products resulting from self-serving
responses by the receiver (or third parties) that have either positive
(+) or negative ()) effects on the partner.
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donor benefits because the self-serving behaviour of the
receiver benefits the investor as a by-product (Connor,
1986). The concept of group augmentation includes the
very same logic. Most ant-mutualisms appear to be cases
of pseudo-reciprocity (Leimar & Connor, 2003): the
partner species typically invests in providing food
rewards, which causes the ants to self-servingly defend
their food sources against their predators.
3. Direct negative pseudo-reciprocity. This control mech-
anism relies on the potential victim’s ability to termi-
nate the interaction (self-servingly), which has negative
effects for the potential exploiter. The two basic
concepts are ‘power’ (Johnstone & Bshary, 2002;
Bowles & Hammerstein, 2003) and ‘sanctions’ (Herre
et al., 1999; Kiers et al., 2003). Sanctions work because
of a sequential game structure. One class of players
makes an initial investment that is available to members
of another class of interaction partners that have to
make their offer. The initial investor can then selec-
tively stop the interaction if a partner did not offer net
benefits, through which the partner loses everything.
Experimental evidence for sanctions has been provided
in leguminose plant–rhizobia interactions, where plants
selectively stop the maintenance of nodules in which
the bacteria fail to fix a minimum amount of nitrogen
(Kiers et al., 2003). Power differs from sanctions in that
actions are not sequential but parallel. Many real life
interactions usually last some time, allowing a potential
exploitee to prematurely end an interaction. This selects
for potential cheaters to cooperate as long as the payoff
of a prolonged cooperative interaction is higher than the
payoff of a shorter exploitative interaction. Both power
and sanctions may yield cooperative outcomes in one-
off interactions.
A third form of negative pseudo-reciprocity is partner
switching. If a player cheats, the victim’s best option may
be to switch to another partner for the next interaction
(Ferrie`re et al., 2002; Bshary & Grutter, 2002a). Partner
switching requires a repeated game structure and an
asymmetry between cheater and victim: the cheater
must belong to the abundant class of players from which
individuals are chosen by potential victims, which are the
members of the rare class of players. Under these
circumstances, leaving a cheater is self serving while
the cheater incurs a cost because it will spend some time
without any interaction partner. Client reef fish with
access to several cleaning stations appear to use switching
as a mechanism to control the behaviour of cleaner
wrasses (Bshary & Scha¨ffer, 2002).
4. Indirect positive pseudo-reciprocity. This concept is based
on ‘social prestige’ (Zahavi, 1995; Roberts, 1998; Lotem
et al., 2003). In social prestige individuals signal their
quality (cooperative behaviour is a handicap) to bystand-
ers through helping. Bystanders choosing to interact with
individuals with high prestige make a self-serving deci-
sion; they can expect personal benefits from this choice,
like females choosing a high quality male to sire her
offspring. In cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner
wrasse Labroides dimidiatus, clients pay attention to how
cleaners treat their current client and cleaners are
therefore more cooperative towards their current client
in the presence of bystanders (Bshary & Grutter, 2006).
Clients are self-serving in choosing to interact with a
cleaner that treated another client well and avoiding
interactions with a cleaner that cheated another client as
they make their choice in order to increase the average
service quality they receive.
5. Indirect negative pseudo-reciprocity. The concept
applies to situations where an actor helps a recipient
because otherwise a third party individual would do
best by evicting the actor from the area. The concept
could be applied to helpers that ‘pay-to-stay’ (Gaston,
1978) in cooperative breeding: helpers invest in off-
spring because otherwise it would be in the self interest
of the breeder to evict the helper. However, it is a
matter of perspective whether the helper actually helps
the offspring or the breeder to avoid eviction from the
territory. In the latter case, the helper would provide
food to avoid direct negative pseudo-reciprocity (as it
has been classified by Bergmu¨ller et al. (2007a), but see
Gilchrist (2007).
6. Positive direct reciprocity (= ‘reciprocity’, reciprocal
altruism’, ‘reciprocal investment’, ‘parcelling’). The con-
trolling aspect of positive reciprocity is based on reward-
ing cooperative partners: as long as the partner invests,
the focal individual invests in return. If the partner
cheats, however, the focal individual switches to cheat-
ing as well in the next round. Tit-for-tat and its cousins
(Dugatkin, 1997) are the key strategies for repeated game
structures. A special case is ‘parcelling’ (Connor, 1986,
1995), where partners cut the total investment into
pieces and transfer a shot prisoner’s dilemma into an
iterated game. The classic example is the egg trading in
hamlet fish, a simultaneous hermaphrodite (Fischer,
1988).
7. Negative direct reciprocity (=‘punishment’). This con-
trol mechanism is based on an individual inflicting costs
on a noncooperating partner at own expenses. Punish-
ment therefore reduces the immediate payoff of the
punisher (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995). In contrast to
sanctions, punishment can therefore only evolve in a
repeated game structure (unless it provides indirect
fitness benefits, see Gardner & West, 2004). The function
of the act is to alter the future behaviour of the victim
towards cooperative behaviour, which will then benefit
the punisher. An empirical example based on experi-
mental evidence are client reef fish that respond to
cheating by cleaners with aggression, which causes
cleaners to behave more cooperatively towards the same
client in their next interaction (Bshary & Grutter, 2002b,
2005). Also the pay-to-stay concept may be a form of
negative direct reciprocity if the breeder punishes a non-
contributing helper rather than evicting it. Only future
empirical studies can reveal the relative importance of
10
punishment and eviction for stable contributions of
helpers in cooperatively breeding species where helping
is based on pay-to-stay.
8. Indirect positive reciprocity (=‘image scoring’, ‘gener-
alized reciprocity’). In indirect reciprocity based on
image scoring, individuals invest only in partners that
have sufficiently helped others in the past (Alexander,
1987). Helping raises the ‘image score’ while failure to
help reduces the score. An image score above a critical
threshold is necessary to receive help from third parties
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Leimar & Hammerstein,
2001). Empirical evidence for indirect positive reciprocity
based on image scoring is currently restricted to humans
(Wedekind & Milinski, 2000).
Another form of indirect positive reciprocity is gener-
alized reciprocity. In this game, the logical order of
reasoning is reversed: rather than investing in order to
receive benefits in the future, individuals that received
help are willing to invest into third parties. The identity of
the third party or the third party’s past behaviour do not
influence decisions; players only need to know what
happened to themselves rather than how potential recip-
ients behaved in the past (Pfeiffer et al., 2004; Hamilton &
Taborsky, 2005). First evidence for this concept has been
provided in rats (Rutte & Taborsky, 2007).
9. Indirect negative reciprocity (‘policing’, ‘strong reci-
procity’). Indirect negative reciprocity is also called
policing. Policing occurs in hymenoptera where workers
eat the eggs laid by other workers and attack these
‘cheaters’ (Ratnieks & Wenseleers, 2005). However, it is
unclear how relatedness between individuals influences
policing, therefore kin selection might be involved.
Indirect negative reciprocity has also attracted much
attention in studies on human behaviour (Fehr &
Ga¨chter, 2002), as humans are willing to pay money in
order to punish individuals who behaved uncoopera-
tively towards others in one-shot games under anony-
mous laboratory conditions (‘strong reciprocity’).
The social scientists’ approach
Game theoretic analyses may predict which conditional
strategy should be used to ensure revenues under specific
circumstances. However, it might not be possible for the
individuals involved to play a certain strategy because
of cognitive limitations. For instance, tit-for-tat players
may need to individually recognize partners and keep
track of past interactions with these partners (book
keeping), which requires some learning and memory
capacities (Hammerstein, 2003b). Social evolutionary
scientists have introduced a research field to cooperation
and altruism that focuses on decision making in humans.
Differences in cognitive abilities are often used as
argument why humans should be able to cooperate with
unrelated individuals on a scale that is apparently
unmatched in other animals (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2002;
Gintis et al., 2003). It is proposed that human cooperation
is often special with respect to the complexity of
mechanisms that govern human decisions such as
emotion, language, ‘high level’ culture, norms, moral
judgement or long term memory (Fehr & Fischbacher,
2003; Gintis, 2006).
It is important to note that differences in cognitive
abilities are differences with respect to the mechanisms
underlying behaviour, which do not lead to differences
with respect to the evolutionary pathways that promote
cooperation (West et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the fact
that many humans are willing to reward cooperative
third parties and to punish egoistic third parties in
anonymous one-shot interactions (Fehr & Ga¨chter,
2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003) is certainly intriguing.
Such ‘strong reciprocators’ leave the experiment with
less money in their pocket than individuals who coop-
erate in direct interactions but do not reward or punish
third parties. While the propensity to show such behav-
iours must yield either direct or indirect benefits under
natural conditions (Gardner & West, 2004; Lehmann
et al., 2007), we clearly need to understand how such
behaviours can be promoted on the proximate level.
Scientists working on animals should join the social
scientists’ quest of understanding decision making pro-
cesses. Species in which behaviour is primarily geneti-
cally determined may easily evolve an appropriate
strategy (West et al., 2006b). But in species where
learning plays a role, the type of behaviour that is
learned is typically influenced by short-term reward and
punishment, i.e. through operant conditioning (Wynne,
2001), which leads to strong discounting of the future
(Wynne, 2001; Stephens et al., 2002). Therefore, as long
as individuals receive a larger short-term benefit if they
do not invest or punish, it is not immediately evident
how they should learn to behave as a strong reciprocators
because of delayed benefits. Humans apparently discount
the future much less than other animals tested so far
(Wynne, 2001), which means that their cognitive con-
straint on accepting low immediate payoffs in favour of
high delayed payoffs is much smaller than that of other
animals. In addition, humans have evolved a powerful
alternative to immediate material benefits: a highly
evolved neocortex provides humans with emotions and
the ability to develop moral judgement, which in turn
provides humans with self rewarding immediate psycho-
logical benefits for helping and for punishment of trans-
gressors (de Quervain et al., 2004). Other proximate
mechanisms of cooperation in humans seem to be deeply
rooted and beyond conscious assessment. For example,
humans behave more cooperatively in the presence of
artificial eyes (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al.,
2006). Also hormones can mediate human cooperative
behaviour. For example, oxytocin increases trust in
partners (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Such mechanisms can be
expected to play a role across the animal kingdom.
However, only future studies may reveal their impor-
tance and limitations.
11
Discussion
We attempted to clarify four major approaches to
understand the evolution and persistence of coopera-
tion and altruism: evolutionary pathways, ecological
settings, conditional strategies, and the social scientists’
approach. Similar to the well-known ‘4 why-questions’
in biology (Tinbergen, 1963), these questions should be
seen as complementary, not as alternatives. We showed
that the four approaches differ with respect to the
‘conditions’ and the ‘mechanisms’ they study. As a
consequence, one may study helping with regards to
the lifetime or the immediate fitness consequences for
the actor. In addition, depending on the approach
taken one may be interested primarily in the social
behaviour of individuals or additionally in the outcome
of interactions. We believe that by highlighting
these distinctions the different perspectives become
apparent, so that we can reduce potential misunder-
standings among researchers working on different
aspects and perspectives of helping. Only considering
all approaches will allow us to obtain a comprehensive
understanding of cooperation and altruism and the
potential differences between humans and other spe-
cies. Besides, we should not forget that the other ‘why’
questions of Tinbergen (1963), namely questions about
the phylogeny and the ontogeny of cooperative and
altruistic behaviour provide additional important in-
sights.
Some examples of how the four approaches can be
confused
We believe that a key source for confusion in the
cooperation ⁄ altruism literature is that discussions mix
evolutionary pathways with ecological contexts, indi-
vidual strategies and cognitive mechanisms. Lehmann
& Keller (2006) shed light on the existing confusion
between basic social evolution theory and the eco-
logical approach. West et al. (2007) further clarify this
issue and explain in detail how the social scientists’
approach can be confused with basic social evolution
theory. Here, we want to highlight in particular the
confusion over strategies. In the only textbook on
animal cooperation, Dugatkin (1997) tries to classify all
known examples according to four categories: by-
product mutualism, reciprocity, kin selection and group
selection. These four categories are a mixture of two
strategies (by-product mutualism and reciprocity), one
evolutionary pathway (kin selection), and one eco-
logical condition (between group competition). We
illustrate the confusion with two examples, namely
kin selection and reciprocity. First, kin selection
describes an evolutionary pathway that explains altru-
istic behaviour. The ecological conditions for kin
selection most generally involve a mechanism for
nonrandom assortment of individuals such as limited
migration so that individuals interact in part with
relatives. On the strategic level, helping could be
conditional on relatedness or indiscriminative. On the
cognitive level, conditional helping requires some rules
how an individual may recognize relatives, such as
growing up together or having a similar smell. Reci-
procity is a strategy while the evolutionary pathway is
‘enforced direct benefits’ according to West et al.
(2007). Ecological conditions may favour longevity
and reduced movement, which in turn favours
(positive direct) reciprocity because this strategy re-
quires a repeated game structure to be evolutionarily
stable. Finally, reciprocity requires some cognitive
abilities as individuals must remember certain aspects
of past interactions.
Similarly to Dugatkin, Nowak (2006) distinguishes
five major ‘mechanisms’ for the evolution of cooper-
ation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reci-
procity, network reciprocity and group selection.
Direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity describe the
controlling aspect of strategies that make sure (under
certain conditions) that an investment yields on aver-
age higher returns. Kin selection is one main path to
promote helping (here: altruistic) behaviour but several
strategies could yield the benefits. Ecological circum-
stances that lead to between group competition or
limited migration may in turn promote direct benefits
or kin selection. Both ‘group selection’ and network
reciprocity explore such ecological parameters (Leh-
mann & Keller, 2006).
Finally, West et al. (2007) (1) show that cognitive
mechanisms should not be confused with evolutionary
pathways, and (2) intend to counter the general percep-
tion that kin selection and reciprocity are the two main
concepts to explain helping behaviour. We fully agree as
kin selection and reciprocity are not complementary
concepts but they address helping on two different levels
(pathways and strategies). To match levels, one could
either propose that direct enforced benefits and kin
selection are the two main pathways to explain helping,
or one could propose that reciprocity and helping
individuals that are raised by one’s mother (or alterna-
tively who grew up on the same territory or who smell
similarly) are the two main strategies to explain helping.
We would certainly disagree with the latter statement as
evidence for direct reciprocity is scarce (Dugatkin, 1997;
Bergstrom et al., 2003).
Links between the four research fields
While we argue that it is important to distinguish
between the four fields, it is clear that the four fields
are partly linked and that future progress depends on
further integration. The most basic common denomina-
tor is that all concepts are linked to basic social evolution
theory, as they ultimately explore the potential of direct
and ⁄or indirect fitness benefits to cause selection on
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helping. The ecological approach is most tightly linked to
basic evolution theory, as becomes apparent from a
recent target article with responses (Lehmann & Keller,
2006).
Ecology and game theory are implicitly linked as the
ecology of a species translates into the game structure
(Bshary & Bronstein, 2004). The number of rounds two
individuals may on average play with each other
depend on longevity and migration patterns. A payoff
matrix is ideally a reflection of the ecological conditions.
Game theoreticians still have to build their models more
on the empirical evidence in order to make the models
more applicable ⁄ testable. For example, we need models
where the payoff can be variable, as it happens in
nature when ecological conditions change. It is intui-
tively obvious that exact payoffs depend on the condi-
tion of the player(s) involved, i.e. hunger level or
physical strength. In interspecific mutualisms, the ser-
vice provided by one partner often depends on the
population dynamics of a third species. For example,
ants provide their various partner species with protec-
tion against predators in return for food and ⁄or shelter
(Pierce et al., 2002; Heil & McKey, 2003). The partners
attract ants with food and hence have rather fixed
expenses. The ants, however, can only provide a service
if their partner is actually attacked by a predator.
Therefore in years with a high predator density, ants
more than compensate their partners’ investments
while in years with low predator density they simply
cannot. Similarly, cleaner fish may reduce the parasite
load of their clients only to an effective degree if the
ectoparasite populations are high. In contrast, if ecto-
parasite densities are low, cleaners might feed more on
mucus and hence become increasingly parasitic (Grut-
ter, 1997).
Finally, there are also important links between game
theory and the social scientists’ approach (the social
scientists combined them of course from the beginning).
For any game structure, it is important to find out (1)
which strategies ⁄partner control mechanisms may pro-
mote cooperative behaviour, and (2) what cognitive
requirements are necessary to use a strategy ⁄ a control
mechanism successfully under the specified conditions.
For example, Hammerstein (2003b) proposes that reci-
procity is rare in nature, but not necessarily because the
game structure is rare, but because most animals lack the
cognitive requirements of individual recognition and
particularly book keeping. However, such potential
constraints have rarely been investigated. It remains a
vastly open research field to study the decision making
processes that cause cooperating, punishing and cheating
in animals.
Towards more realistic concepts of helping
A key remaining challenge is to try to understand
variation between individuals. Why are some individ-
uals ‘unconditional cooperators’ and others ‘egoists’? In
humans one may distinguish different individual types
(Ostrom et al., 1999) such as ‘free riders’, ‘cautious
cooperators’ (only cooperate when return is protected
against free riders), ‘hopeful cooperators’ (initiate
investment), and ‘unconditional cooperators’ (believe
in common goods). Such strategies may be inflexible
and thus describe a certain type of individual coping
style or personality (Wilson et al., 1994; Gosling &
John, 1999). Differences between individuals also have
been demonstrated in nonhuman animals and are
termed ‘animal personalities’ or ‘behavioural syn-
dromes’ (Drent et al., 2003; Sih et al., 2004). Lions
provide a famous example in the context of coopera-
tive territory defence, where one can distinguish
between unconditional cooperators, conditional coop-
erators, conditional laggards and unconditional laggards
(Heinsohn & Packer, 1995).
Consistent individual differences may persist because
of constraints (Sih et al., 2004). Sherratt & Roberts
(2002) introduced ‘phenotypic defectors’ in their model,
which are individuals that are too weak to be able to
help others, and found that the variation in condition
stabilizes the persistence of cooperative behaviour (see
also Lotem et al., 2003). Alternatively, consistent indi-
vidual differences may be adaptive in that they are
equivalent to certain strategies or niche options (i.e.
alternative strategies) within a species or population
(Bergmu¨ller & Taborsky, 2007). Although much of
cooperation theory implicitly assumes the existence of
different explicit and fixed types, such as ‘cooperators’
and ‘defectors’, only with the recent increase in focus
on the behaviour of individuals has the significance of
individual strategies with regards to cooperative inter-
actions started to become elucidated (Arnold et al.,
2005; Komdeur, 2006, 2007; Bergmu¨ller & Taborsky,
2007). In this context, a model by McNamara et al.
(2004) is of major importance. The authors analysed a
game where players could potentially interact with the
same partner for 100 rounds but the interaction would
be terminated if one of them cheated. The ESS solution
is a distribution of strategies coding for playing a
different number of rounds cooperatively before cheat-
ing (McNamara et al., 2004). We clearly need empirical
and theoretical studies to establish to what extent
behavioural syndromes in animals are linked to
different levels of cooperative behaviour.
From what we developed above, we argue that a key
shortcoming of most current modelling efforts on coop-
eration is that the models still focus on symmetric game
structures where each individual chooses between the
same behavioural options. In Nature, however, many
interactions are based on asymmetrical strategy sets
(Bshary & Grutter, 2002a; Bshary & Bronstein, 2004;
Bergmu¨ller et al., 2007a). For example, a dominant is
much more likely than a subordinate to use punishment
to enforce cooperative behaviour. In many cases, only
13
one player has the option to cheat while the partner
simply lacks the option (i.e. cannot perform such
behaviour). Only a stronger collaboration between the-
oreticians and empiricists will allow us to ensure that
future models are based on real-life examples, yielding
testable predictions that provide feedback that may be
used to readjust theory.
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